Offering a fresh perspective on the first of the "Indian Wars," Joseph R. Fischer reassesses the historical value of a campaign generally regarded as one of the Continental army's strategic fiascoes. The expedition led by Major General John Sullivan sought to punish the Iroquois Confederacy for a series of devastating raids in western New York and Pennsylvania.

Sullivan and his four brigades of Continental regulars torched forty Iroquois settlements and destroyed 160,000 acres of corn but ultimately failed in removing the Iroquois from the conflict. Instead, the crusade increased the dependency of the Iroquois remnant on its British supporters and galvanized raiding activities. Fischer suggests that the historical focus on the campaign's failure has overshadowed its importance as a vehicle for understanding the Continental army at a turning point in the war.

He demonstrates that this representative slice of the Continental army provides exceptional insight into the growing professionalism of George Washington's military.