An in-depth study of the effects of Israel's internal struggles on the Arab-Israeli peace process, this book examines how Israel's leaders and citizens have reacted to the various proposals in the post-Camp David era, including the 1982 Reagan plan, the 1988 Shultz initiative, and the 1989 Mubarak and Baker plans. Ziva Flamhaft also analyzes reactions to the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993.

Focusing on the domestic political scene, she exposes the efforts of the Israeli political right to undermine the peace process and illuminates the dramatic consequences of that process - the reaction of Prime Minister Begin to the Reagan plan, the near collapse of the National Unity Government (NUG) in 1987-1988, and the ultimate fall of the NUG in 1990 as a result of the Baker plan.

Flamhaft then looks at how the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War helped to encourage negotiations and evaluates why the Likud Party was replaced by Labor in 1992. Finally, Flamhaft demonstrates the futility of third-party mediation when negotiations are rejected domestically and discusses the essential conditions required for effective mediation.