Written by Bernie Weisz Historian & Book Reviewer Vietnam War Pembroke Pines, Florida May 19, 2008 e mail:BernWei1@aol.com Title of Review: "A psychiatrist's view of the Vietnam War" "Men, Stress, and Vietnam" by Peter Bourne is a fascinating book that records Bourne's personal experiences and impressions in South Vietnam from Oct. 1965 to Oct. 1966. Bourne, a psychiatrist, covers areas from his specialty to other branches of medicine, as well as anthropology and sociology. One center of my own concern when I review books about the Vietnam War is to try to find statements that point out our folly in being there in the first place. With Bourne's book, it popped out on page 1. Bourne compares our ill-fated involvement with a fable that Bourne writes: "Once upon a time a fish and a monkey were caught up in a great flood. The monkey, agile and experienced, had the good fortune to scramble up a tree in safety. As he looked down to the raging water he saw the fish struggling against the swift current. Filled with a desire to help his less fortunate fellow, he reached down and swooped the fish from the water. To the monkey's surprise, the fish was not very grateful for this aid". This oriental fable colorfully illustrated the way in which the altruistic efforts of advanced countries to induce cultural changes are frequently viewed by the recipients of their efforts in the underdeveloped nations of this world. This seems to be happening in Iraq now. Blinded by our own intentions, our technologically advanced country is incapable of adequately comprehending any culture but our own (Democracy vs. a Muslim ruled society that for the most part views Americans as "Infidels") and is unable to accept the fact that the changes we seek in Iraq might be inappropriate to a social framework we do not understand. Since the aid we offer is done in a generous and humanitarian spirit, it is difficult for this country to accept our failures or the seeming ingratitude of this Muslim country we wish to help. The involvement of the United States in South Vietnam was a classic example of the kind of relationship that the aforementioned fable warned against. It has led to the commitment of billions of wasted taxpayer dollars and shamefully the waste of more than 58,000 American men and women who lost their lives there. Only rarely mentioned are the tens of thousands of Vietnamese, both North and South, who also lost their lives in that war. In addition, 5,241 dead are rarely mentioned from other countries that also fought in S. Vietnam alongside U.S. troops from 1962-1973. Robert Blackburn, in his book "Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's More Flags" notes: "The free world countries which sent ground troops to South Vietnam and their totals killed in action were: Republic of Korea, 4,407, Australia and New Zealand 475, Thailand 350, Phillipines, 9". Other areas of interest Bourne touches on is combat psychiatry and the study of stress, a paradigm of 4 different individuals that lived in Saigon that had 4 different views (pro, con, indifferent, opportunistic, etc.) of the war. Also examined was American and Vietnamese psychiatric casualties and how they were dealt with, how dust off helicopter ambulence crew members dealt with life and death, hair raising stress of flying into hot and hostile combat zones to extract the dying, dead and severely wounded. Bourne also conducted psychological studies of 3 groups in Vietnam. They were the 20,000 Australians and 5,200 Korean troops, the Montagnards (they were nomadic, hill-people that were indigenous to the countryside and pro-American) and the Special Forces troops that went out into the boondock rural countryside and set up remote bases and went on "hunter-killer" and assssination missions. Bourne's chapter on the Special Forces is extremely violent, brutal, graphic and memorable. However, for my purpose, the most interesting part of the book was Bourne's treatment of the war itself. Bourne points out that the Vietnam War was unique because of the technological refinement of destructive tools science provided for men to kill each other. The highly efficient M-16 and later AK-47 rifles elevated the individual soldier to a new status as a formidable agent of destruction in his own right. Bourne compares the impact of the helicopter with it's rapid mobility in transporting men from highly secure areas into the most intense jungle combat and back to security again in minutes with the chariot that transported Roman Legions into combat for the first time 3,000 years ago. Another interesing topic Bourne explores was how exceptional news coverage deluged the public with up to date information about the ("living-room") war demanding that citizens form personal impressions on all aspects of our involvement. This is also occurring now with our war with Iraq. A more sophisticated and informed public asked Kennedy, L.B.J. and Nixon about the reasons for this war (which were never satisfactorily answered). Undoubtedly, Bourne explains that the major reason for the development of the anti-Vietnam war movement in the U.S. had been the decision of the government to permit it to exist. Currently, the American public scorned Bush about the issue of "weapons of mass destruction" and how they never turned up in Iraq. As in Vietnam then, and Iraq now, the effects of administration policy on the civil population (lies and deception about the conduct and goals of the war) is one of a negative impact on the attitudes and morale of the fighting man (read Cecil Currey's "Long Binh Jail" and his discussion of the practice of "fragging", "dapping" and heroin use amongst U.S. forces in post Tet Vietnam). Bourne presents an interesting argument with his discussion of the odd way the U.S. became heavily involved in the Vietnam War with the "Tonkin Gulf Incident". Supposedly, 2 Vietnamese Patrol Boats "attacked" 2 destroyers(the "Maddox" and the "Turner Joy") in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam in August,1964. North Vietnam was known for not having a navy,and a patrol boat is highly unlikely to attack a destroyer (it is 1/100 the size, not to mention it's extremely limited firepower) and members of the rader team aboard the 2 destroyers "weren't sure" this actually happened (is this a bad joke?). Read about this false pretext that resulted in 56,000 dead Americans in Joseph C. Goulden's book "Truth is the First Casualty:The Gulf of Tonkin Affair-Illusion and Reality" or rent a documentary at a video store by former Secretary of War Robert S. McNamera called "The Fog of War". With Iraq, what set this country off was the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the Pentagon and World Trade Centers. Bourne notes that when a war starts in this country, like Pearl Harbor and W.W. II or Iraq and 9/11, the leaders of this country ask the population to regress to a childlike role, trusting the leaders omnipotence to deal with the danger at hand. The greater the crisis (9/11 and Pres. Bush), the more willing the regression. If the survival of the society is genuinely threatened the people will virtually relinquish all their rights to the leaders. If the danger is not clearly apparent than there will be more open resentment to the imposition of such restictions. What was the danger to the U.S. in our war with Vietnam? Was Ho Chi Minh threatening world conquest like Adolf Hitler? How about Kennedy's "Domino Theory? (if we allow Communist North Vietnam to swallow up South Vietnam, other countries between Vietnam and the United States (e.g. the Phillipines, Guam, Hawaii, and finally onto the shores of California) will fall like "domino's" to communism). Come on, this war was rediculous! Bourne also explores from a psychological point of view how the transition from a "peace set" to a "war set" is immeasurably facilitated and more readily accepted if it can be sudden and clear cut. Examples were declarations of war by the U.S. after:the mysterious explosion and sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana Harbor by Cuban insurgents in the "Spanish American War" (1898), the torpedoing and sinking in international waters of innocent U.S. citizens in international waters by German U-boats (the "Luisitania") bringing the U.S. into W.W. I (1918), the sneak attack of Pearl Harbor by Japan signalling America's entry into W.W. II (1941), and although a U.N. "police action" the North Korean surprise invasion of South Korea igniting America's entry into the "Korean War" (1950). Accomplishment of such a transition from peace to war with the aforementioned examples is the primary internal function of an official declaration of war. This never occurred in the Vietnam War. Prior to Vietnam, after a declaration of war there was the imposition of harsh repressive measures such as the immediate incarceration of political dissidents and the conviction of critics of our government or it's policies. Bourne explains that thousands were jailed during W.W. I and II for often trivial criticism of U.S. policy. Aside from the incidents of the Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968 (Chicigo Mayor Daly had his police "goons" severely beat up protesters objecting to the conduct of the Vietnam War on national TV) and the murder of 4 innocent students at Kent State University in Ohio, 1970 when the National Guard opened up with "live ammunition" at college students protesting the Vietnam War, the failure to impose similar strong governmental suppression of dissent in connection with the Vietnam conflict was an innovation and a significant departure from the traditional and expected behavior of our government under those circumstances. Bourne concludes with 2 reasons why we lost the Vietnam War. First, the involvement in Vietnam developed over the course of 3 administrations (Kennedy-L.B.J.-Nixon) none of whom wished to take full responsibility for having initiated our commitment. With the escalation occrring incrementally over many years, there was no decisive point at which a declaration of war was legitimately called for. Secondly, and most important, from 1964-1968 (prior to the January 30, 1968 Tet Offensive), a genuine belief existed that victory in some form was imminent. It was incomprehensible to entertain the belief that our immense military capability could be stalemated by the combined efforts of a disgruntled peasant society and a seemingly minor military power such as North Vietnam. Unfortunately, this false notion led to the premature death of 58,000 Americans whose only tribute today is a wall honoring them in Washington, D.C. And what about the 4,000 dead (so far) U.S. servicemen from our effort in Iraq? The basic lesson of history is:"history repeats itself:those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it". Is this happening now? Bourne's book is very hard to find, but is well worth the search. It is a very informative, satisfying read!